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In this note we study the endogenous formation of cooperation structures. Ac-
cording to several equilibrium concepts the full cooperation structure will form or
some structure that is payo-equivalent to the full cooperation structure. As a
by-product we nd a class of games in strategic form where several equilibrium
concepts coincide.
Journal of Economic Literature classication numbers: C71, C72.
1 Introduction
In the past few years several papers have modelled the process of distributing the payos
in a cooperative situation as a two-stage game. In the rst stage, the players negotiate
on the cooperation structure. The second stage then determines the payos, usually
according to some exogenously given allocation rule.
In this note we will follow Dutta, Nouweland,a n dTijs (1998). They analyze the
link formation games introduced by Myerson (1991), which were also studied by Qin
(1996). Dutta et al. (1998) nd that given a superadditive game and an allocation
rule satisfying some appealing properties, the full cooperation structure will form or a
structure resulting in the same payos as the full cooperation structure. These results
are shown for two equilibriumconcepts, undominated Nash equilibriaand coalition proof
Nash equilibria. We will extend these results for several other equilibrium concepts,
specically strictly proper, proper, weakly proper, strictly perfect and perfect equilibria.
As a by-product we nd a class of games in strategic form where several equilibrium
concepts coincide.
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The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 deals with games in strategic form, e-
quilibrium concepts for such games, and the relation between these equilibriumconcepts.
In section 3 we describe and analyze the link formation games. We show that according
to the equilibrium concepts described in section 2 the full cooperation structure will
form or a cooperation structure that results in the same payo as the full cooperation
structure.
2 Games in strategic form
In this section we introduce some notation for games in strategic form. We also show
some relationships between equilibrium concepts, which will be used in the subsequent
section on link formation games. For a survey of equilibrium concepts for games in
strategic form we refer to Van Damme (1991).
Let Γ = (N;(S i) i2N;(f i) i2N) be a game in strategic form, where N = f1;:::;ng
denotes the player set, Si the strategy space of player i,a n df ithe payo function of
player i, which assigns to every tuple s 2 S =
Q
i2N Si ap a y o f i ( s )2IR . D e n o t e
f =( f i) i 2 N.
The rst equilibrium concept we dene is the undominated Nash equilibrium. Recall
that a strategy prole is a Nash equilibrium if no player can improve his payo by a
unilateral deviation. For any i 2 N, si dominates s0
i if for all s−i 2 S−i :=
Q
j2NnfigSi,
fi(si;s −i)f i(s 0
i;s −i) with the inequality being strict for some s−i 2 S−i.N o w ,s 
i2S i
is an undominated strategy if there is no si 2 Si such that si dominates s
i.L e tS u
i(Γ)
be the set of undominated strategies for i in Γ and dene Su(Γ) :=
Q
i2N Su
i (Γ). If no
confusion on the underlying game can arise we simply write Su
i and Su. A strategy tuple
s is an undominated Nash equilibrium if s is a Nash equilibrium and s 2 Su.
A strategy si of player i is a weakly dominant strategy if for all s−i 2 S−i and all
s0
i 2 Si, fi(si;s −i)f i(s 0
i;s −i). Denote the set of weakly dominant strategies of player
i by Sw
i (Γ) and dene Sw(Γ) :=
Q
i2N Sw
i (Γ). We also write Sw
i and Sw if no confusion
on Γ can arise. Note that every s 2 Sw is a Nash equilibrium and that every weakly
dominant strategy is undominated.
The following lemma shows that if a player has a weakly dominant strategy, then all
his undominated strategies are weakly dominant.
Lemma 2.1 Let Γ be a game in strategic form. If Sw





i . Assume Sw
i 6= ;, so there exists si 2 Sw
i .L e ts 0
i2S u
i.W e
will show that s0
i is a weakly dominant strategy. Since si is a weakly dominant strategy it3
holds for all s−i 2 S−i that fi(si;s −i)f i(s 0
i;s −i). But s0
i is undominated and hence this
inequality holds with equality for all s−i 2 S−i.S i n c es iis a weakly dominant strategy
this implies that s0
i is a weakly dominant strategy and hence, Sw
i  Su
i . This completes
the proof.
2
Remark 2.1 Note that if si;s 0
i 2Sw
i (Γ) then for all s−i 2 S−i it holds that fi(si;s −i)=
f i( s 0
i;s −i).
From now on assume that the strategy space of every player is nite, i.e. jSij < 1
for all i 2 N. A mixed strategy pi of player i is a probability distribution on Si.T h e
probability player i assigns to strategy k 2 Si will be denoted by pk
i . Hence, the set of
















Denote Γp =( N ;(P i) i2N;(f0
i) i2N), the mixed extension of Γ, where f0
i(p) denotes the
expected payo to player i according to mixed strategy prole p =( p i ) i 2 N 2P:=
Q










j f i( s ) :
For notational convenience we dene for all i 2 N and all s−i 2 S−i the probability







For all i 2 N and all k 2 Si denote the mixed strategy associated with pure strategy k







1 ; if l = k
0 ; otherwise
:
Furthermore, we denote for all s 2 S, es =( e i;si)i2N.
Before we can dene strictly proper equilibria we need some more notation. For all
i =(  k









i; for all k 2 Si
o
:
For  =(  i ) i 2 N 2
Q
i 2 N IR
S i
++ the set of Nash equilibria of the game
(N;P1(1);:::;P n( n);f0) is denoted by E(Γp;). This game is called a perturbed game.
1For notational convenience we will simply write Pi in stead of P(Si).4
In such a perturbed game every player plays each of his strategies with at least some pre-








++;<^  g .
Now, we can describe the strictly proper equilibria of a strategic form game Γ. A




++ and a continuous map  ! p()f r o mU ^ to P =
Q
i2N Pi such that p() 2
E(Γp;) for all  and lim#0p()=p . The set of strictly proper Nash equilibria in Γ
will be denoted by StrProp(Γ). Note that by denition a strictly proper equilibrium of a
strategic form game is a mixed strategy of that game. This strategy does not necessarily
correspond to a pure strategy.
In the following lemma we show that every weakly dominant strategy in the mixed
extension of a game puts positive weights on strategies that are weakly dominant in the
original game.




p)=c o n v f e i;k j k 2 S
w
i (Γ)g:2
Proof: First we will show that Sw
i (Γp)  convfei;k j k 2 Sw
i (Γ)g.L e t p i2 S w
i(Γp)
and suppose pi 62 convfei;k j k 2 Sw
i (Γ)g. Note that every mixed strategy is a convex




Since pi 62 convfei;k j k 2 Sw
i (Γ)g there exists l 2 Si with l 62 Sw
i (Γ) and pl
i > 0. Since
l 62 Sw





> > > <
> > > :
pk
i ; for all k 2 Sinfl;^ lg
pk
i +pl
i ;k= ^ l
0 ;k= l
:
Let p−i =( p j) j 2 N nfig be the mixed strategy prole of Nnfig associated with s−i, i.e.










f i( ^ l;s−i)−fi(l;s−i)

> 0:
So, pi 62 Sw





p)  convfei;k j k 2 S
w
i (Γ)g:
Secondly, we will show that all pi 2 convfei;k j k 2 Sw
i (Γ)g belong to Sw
i (Γp). There-
fore, let pi 2 convfei;k j k 2 Sw
i (Γ)g.L e t p − i2 P − i:=
Q
j2NnfigPj and let ^ pi 2 Pi.

















































where the equalities follow by denition of the strategies. The inequality follows since




So, pi is a weakly dominant strategy in Γp. Hence,
Sw
i (Γp)  convfei;k j k 2 Sw
i (Γ)g:
This completes the proof.
2
Before we can prove the main result of this section, we need two more lemmas. First
we show that every weakly dominant mixed strategy prole is a strictly proper Nash
equilibrium.




Proof: Let p 2 Sw(Γp). We have to show that p 2 StrProp(Γ). By lemma 2.2 it holds















++ with ^ k
i = 1
m for all i 2f 1 ;:::;ngand all
















k 2 S w
i (Γ)pk
iqi;k() for all i 2 N.N o t et h a tq i (  )2P i (  i ) for all
i 2 N since ql
i;k()  l
i for all k 2 Sw
i (Γ), all l 2 Si,a n da l li2N .6
Let i 2 N. For all k 2 Sw
i (Γ) the map  ! qi;k()f r o mU ^  to Pi is continuous,
with qi;k() 2 Pi(i) for all , and lim#0qi;k()=e i;k. Then it follows immediately that
 ! q()=( q i(  ))i2N is a continuous map from U^  to P with lim#0 q()=p=( p i) i 2 N.
It remains to show that q() 2 E(Γp;), for all  2 U^ . Therefore, let  2 U^  and
consider a possible deviation of player i 2f 1 ;:::;ng,u i 2P i( i). The change in payo
for player i by deviating from qi()t ou iis equal to
f
0



































































where the equalities follow by denition of the strategies. The inequality holds since for
all k 2 Sw
i (Γ) and all l 2 Sinfkg it holds that ul
i  l
i and since for all k 2 Sw
i (Γ), all
l 2 Sinfkg,a n da l lt − i2S − i,f i( k;t−i)−fi(l;t−i)  0.
This completes the proof.
2
The following result is taken from Van Damme (1991).




Proof: See Van Damme (1991).
2
We can now state the main result of this section.
Theorem 2.1 Let Γ be a game in strategic form. If Sw(Γ) 6= ; then
Su(Γ





convfei;k j k 2 S
w
i (Γ)g:





by lemmas 2.4, 2.1, and 2.3 respectively. Lemma 2.2 completes the proof.
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Recall that every prole of weakly dominant strategies is a Nash equilibrium. Hence,
by lemma 2.1, if every player has a weakly dominant strategy then every strategy pro-
le consisting only of undominated strategies is a Nash equilibrium. There are several
equilibrium concepts that result in supersets of the set of strictly proper Nash equilibria
and subsets of the set of undominated Nash equilibria in mixed strategies. For a survey
see Van Damme (1991). He shows that for a strategic form game with a nite strat-
egy space for all players the sets of (i) proper equilibria, (ii) weakly proper equilibria,
(iii) strictly perfect equilibria, and (iv) perfect equilibria are all supersets of the set of
strictly proper equilibria and subsets of the set of undominated Nash equilibria in mixed
strategies. Using this and the theorem above the following corollary results for strategic
form games with a weakly dominant strategy for all players.
Corollary 2.1 Let Γ be a game in strategic form. If Sw(Γ) 6= ; then the following sets
of equilibria coincide with Sw(Γp) and the set of undominated Nash equilibria in mixed
strategies : strictly proper, proper, weakly proper, strictly perfect, and perfect equilibria.
3 Link formation
In this section we will describe and analyze a class of link formation games, introduced
by Myerson (1991) and also studied by Qin (1996) and Dutta et al. (1998).
A communication situation is a triple (N;v;L), with (N;v) a cooperative game and
(N;L) a cooperation graph (N;L). So, N = f1;:::;ng denotes the player set, v the
characteristic function that assigns to every subset of N a value, and L as e to fp a i r so f
players in N, describing the cooperation possibilities between the players.
The pair (N;L) is an undirected(communication) graph. A link in the graph indicates
that the players forming this link can cooperate with each other directly. If two players
are not connected directly but there is a path in the graph between the players, then
these two players can communicate with each other indirectly via the players on the path.
The notion of connectedness induces a partition of the player set into communication
components, where i and j are in the same component if and only if i = j or i and j
can communicate with each other, directly or indirectly. The resulting partition will be
denoted by N=L.
An allocation rule γ assigns to every communication situation (N;v;L) a payo vector
γ(N;v;L) 2 IR
N . Here, we will restrict ourselves to the same class of allocation rules as
studied by Dutta et al. (1998). This class is described by the following properties.8
 Component eciency (CE): For all communication situations (N;v;L)a n da l l
communication components C 2 N=L it holds that
P
i2C γi(N;v;L)=v ( C) :
 Weak link symmetry (WLS): For all communication situations (N;v;L)a n d
all i;j 2 N,i fγ i ( N;v;L [f f i;jgg) >γ i ( N;v;L)t h e nγ j ( N;v;L [f f i;jgg) >
γj(N;v;L).
 Improvement property (IP): For all communication situations (N;v;L)a n da l l
i;j 2 N, if there exists k 2 Nnfi;jg with γk(N;v;L[ffi;jgg) >γ k( N;v;L), then
γi(N;v;L[f f i;jgg) >γ i( N;v;L)o rγ j( N;v;L[f f i;jgg) >γ j( N;v;L).
The following lemma was proven by Dutta et al. (1998).
Lemma 3.1 Let γ be an allocation rule that satises CE, WLS, and IP and (N;v;L)a
communication situation with (N;v) superadditive.3 For all i;j 2 N it holds that
γi(N;v;L[f f i;jgg)  γi(N;v;L): (2)
Proof: See Dutta et al. (1998)
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The property incorporated in equation (2) will be called link monotonicity.
We will now describe the class of link formation games. Let γ be an allocation rule
and (N;v) a cooperative game. The link formation game Γ(N;v;γ) is described by the
tuple (N;(S i) i2N;(f
γ
i ) i2N)w h e r ef o ra l li2Nthe set Si =2 Nnfig represents the strategy
set of player i. A strategy of player i is an announcement of the set of players he wants
to form communication links with. A communication link between two players will only
form if both players want to form the link. The set of links that will form according to
strategy prole s 2 S =
Q
i2N Si will be denoted by
L(s): =ffi;jgNji2s j;j2 s i g :
The payo function fγ =( f
γ
i) i 2 N is dened as the allocation rule γ applied to the
communication situation (N;v;L(s)), i.e.
f
γ(s)=γ ( N;v;L(s)):
In the following lemma we show that the link formation games described above have
a weakly dominant strategy prole. Moreover, this strategy prole results in the full
cooperation structure (i.e. every player cooperates directly with every other player).
This strategy prole is denoted by  s, i.e.  si = Nnfig for all i 2 N.
3The game (N;v) is superadditive if for all S;T 2 2N with S \ T = ;, v(S)+v ( T)v ( S[T).9
Lemma 3.2 Let γ be an allocation rule that satises CE, WLS, and IP and (N;v)a
superadditive cooperative game. Then s is a weakly dominant strategy prole in the
associated link formation game Γ := Γ(N;v;γ).
Proof: Let i 2 N, si 2 Si and s−i 2 S−i. Dene the following sets of links: L1 =
L(si;s −i)a n dL 2 =L ( s i ;s −i). Since si  si it holds that L2  L1. Furthermore,
L1nL2 f f i;jgjj2N nfigg, since only the strategy of player i has been changed. If
we apply lemma 3.1 for all fi;jg2L 1n L 2then
f
γ




i( s i;s −i): (3)
We conclude that si 2 Sw
i (Γ) and hence, s 2 Sw(Γ).
2
Lemma 3.2 was not proven explicitly in Dutta et al. (1998). However, they showed it
implicitly in showing that  s is an undominated Nash equilibrium.
Now that we have showed the existence of a weakly dominant strategy prole we
can use the results of the previous section to give some relations between equilibrium
concepts for mixed extensions of link formation games.
Theorem 3.1 Let γ be an allocation rule that satises CE, WLS, and IP and let (N;v)
be a superadditive cooperative game. Then the following relations between several equi-




convfei;k j k 2 S
w
i (Γ)g = S
u(Γ
p) = StrProp(Γ) = S
w(Γ
p): (4)









convfei;k j k 2 S
w
i (Γ)g:




convfei;k j k 2 S
w
i (Γ)g:
This completes the proof.
2
Note that the result in theorem 3.1 depends only on the assumption that γ satises
link monotonicity, which is implied by CE, WLS, and IP.
Remark 3.1 Obviously we can also extend the theorem above to include proper, weakly
proper, strictly perfect and perfect equilibria (see corollary 2.1).10






i ;s −i)f o rs o m ei2Nimplies that fγ(s)=f γ( s 0
i ;s −i) (This follows directly from
lemmas 1 and 2 in Dutta et al. (1998)). So, if γ satises CE, WLS, and IP then this
implies that all weakly dominant strategy proles result in the same payo. Dutta et
al. (1998) call structures that lead to identical payos payo-equivalent. Furthermore,
they call a structure essentially complete if it is payo-equivalent to the full coopera-
tion structure. The structures that can result according to any p 2 Su(Γ(N;v;γ)p)=
StrProp(Γ(N;v;γ)) are obviously all essentially complete. We cannot speak of the struc-
ture that will result since p is a mixed strategy prole.
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